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Articles

Information as Verb: Re-conceptualizing Information for
Cognitive and Ecological Models
David G. Casagrande
Department of Anthropology
University of Georgia
Abstract
Current notions of information are inadequate for ecological and cognitive models because they: 1) only account for information gain that results from reducing uncertainty; 2) assume binary logic; 3) fail to account
for semantics and pragmatics; and 4) can not account for shared and externalized cognition. A different model
of information is presented here, which treats information as a process of state change (i.e., the term is used
as a verb), rather than as a variable. The potential for information is defined to include not only stimuli,
but the context of the informational moment; and is distinguished from realized information, which is the
result of a state change. The proposed model also distinguishes epistemological levels of abstraction at which
information takes place. Abstraction, fuzzy logic, and consensus supersede the reduction of uncertainty, and
pragmatic contextual marking of information at different epistemological levels provides a basis for explaining
shared and externalized cognition.
Introduction
The term “information” has been used to describe a variety of organizational forms from genetic
structure to culture. Attempts to include information in ecological models have, however, mostly
relied on vague or enigmatic notions of feedback.
In cognitive models, information is considered to
be all raw data available for processing. But it is
unclear how information is screened or organized.
This paper addresses the need for revision of current notions of information within ecology and
the cognitive sciences. It is particularly important
to bridge the gaps that exist between the scales of
intrapersonal communication, interpersonal communication, and cultural consensus.
Current notions of information, and in particular attempts to quantify information, can be
traced to the work of Claude Shannon (Mingers
1997). In this paper, I will focus on the work of
Klir and Folger (1988), which represents the most
rigorous and recent attempt to model information

mathematically, and because it illustrates the prevalence of Shannon’s original core concepts (Shannon
and Weaver 1949).
My goal is to build upon Klir and Folger’s
theoretical background by first elucidating its
limits, and then incorporating ideas from the disciplines of cognitive studies, linguistics, information
philosophy, and information ecology to develop a
new model of information. I present the case that
current theory is inadequate because it: 1) only
accounts for information gain that results from
reducing uncertainty; 2) assumes binary logic; 3)
fails to model semantics and pragmatics; and 4)
has not modeled shared and externalized cognition. I present a new model, which is based upon
an interdisciplinary synthesis, and forms the basis
for formal development. Such a model is necessary
for understanding human interaction on an interpersonal and organizational level as well as human
relationships with non-human components of the
environment. As such, it is intended to provide a
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basis for clarifying existing conceptual relationships would still be essentially complete, or at least could
between cognitive theory and behavioral ecology. be completed” (Shannon and Weaver 1949:13).
This forms the basis of Klir and Folger’s more
Problem 1. Reduction of Uncertainty as the
recent approach (Klir and Folger 1988), in which
Sole Metric of Information
they propose that the reduction of uncertainty
The prevailing notion of information, formal- by a measurable amount indicates the gain of an
ized by Shannon, is the view of information as equal amount of information. I shall refer to such
neg-entropy, or the reduction of uncertainty. As changes as ‘state changes’. The amount of informaexpressed by Weaver:
tion obtained by an act (or state change) may be
measured by the difference in uncertainty before
That information be measured by entropy is, after
and after the act, and encounters with improbable
all, natural when we remember that information,
entities are considered to have higher information
in communication theory, is associated with
the amount of freedom of choice we have in
content (Klir and Folger 1988:189).
constructing messages. Thus for a communication
But this unidirectional approach (Figure 1)
source one can say, just as he would also say it
is inadequate for human communication because
of a thermodynamic ensemble, ‘This situation
it does not account for the information content
is highly organized, it is not characterized by a
of a message which greatly increases uncertainty
large degree of randomness or of choice—that is
to say, the information (or the entropy) is low.’
(i.e., accelerates entropy; Brainerd and Reyna
(Shannon and Weaver 1949:13)
1990). While it is true that we strive for certainty
in communication, the structure of our mental
A highly probable event allows no freedom
of choice and therefore carries little information. state – our understanding of syntax, meaning and
An example would be the last few letters of the pragmatics – can also be significantly altered by
word “sentence” in this sentence. The “ence” in an experience that reduces certainty. This derives
“sentence” belongs to a class that Weaver calls re- largely from the fact that human information is
dundant; “that is to say, this fraction of the message not an objective measurable entity that operates
is unnecessary (and hence repetitive or redundant) merely on a probability matrix, as described by Klir
in the sense that if it were missing the message
ENTROPY

High
(randomness)

Low
(organization)

INFORMATION

More choice

Little choice

UNCERTAINTY

High

Low

PROBABILITY

Equal

Relative entropy
total
potential
randomness

Redundancy
(inessential to message)
actual value
needed to transmit
message

Unequal

totally organized
and predictable

Figure 1: The Relationships Between Entropy, Information, and Probability as Proposed by
Shannon and Weaver (1949) as a Theory of Communication.
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and Folger. Rather, information represents a state
change (∆) that can include greater uncertainty;
or in the case of organizational communication,
greater consensus regardless of uncertainty.
The unidirectional approach becomes even
more problematic when describing the process
of abstraction. Following the logic of Klir and
Folger, in order for ∆ to have a positive value as
a result of abstraction, the said abstraction must
increase predictability, or be perceived as such. But
the resulting abstraction may or may not increase
certainty. An example is the creation of gist, which
is a mechanism for dealing with inundations of
complex environmental stimuli (Brainerd and
Reyna 1990). Certain attributes of the information set are selected in order to essentialize the
message, but there is no guarantee that the selected
attributes are appropriate for understanding what
the sender of the message intends. In such a case,
abstraction, or gist formation, would not increase
certainty, although ∆ will have occurred. The need
to form abstractions can be considered a necessary
process that increases entropy. That is, cognition
can produce “information states whose structures
are impoverished” (Brainerd and Reyna 1990:19).
Thus, a definition of information limited to
increased certainty is inadequate for describing
the short-term, near-instantaneous processes of
human thought. And, as I will discuss below, such
a definition also constrains attempts to describe
processes of externalized cognition and interpersonal communication.
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Shannon and Weaver consider choices to be
binary (either/or), and hence, information could
be measured by the logarithm to the base 2 (p. 9).
Binary logic is also basic to Klir and Folger’s more
recent theoretical revision (1988). They state that
the truth value of a single proposition (i.e., that an
element x belongs to a probability set) is denoted by
the values 1 and 0, and the unit that characterizes
full uncertainty is a bit (p. 145).
This binary approach has proven to be effective for mathematical formulations and computer
science. Such an approach is not, however, always
applicable to humans. We don’t treat propositions
as either/or decisions; instead we tend to “hedge”
and introduce other variables into the decision
matrix. Analyses of set inclusion indicate that we
often use more than two dimensions simultaneously (D’Andrade 1995:139).

Problem 3. Failure to Model Semantics and
Pragmatics
Information in human communication is
commonly divided into three classes: syntactic
(the relationship among signs employed in communication), semantic (the relationship between
the signs and meaning), and pragmatic (the relation
between entities and their utilities)(Klir and Folger
1988:188; Mingers 1997).
Schwarz’ (1996) analysis of several experiments led him to conclude that pragmatics is the
most important aspect of human communication.
There is a “common misperception that language
use has primarily to do with words and what they
Problem 2. Limits of Binary Logic
Binary logic is another core concept from mean. It doesn’t. It has primarily to do with people
Shannon and Weaver’s conceptualization of com- and what they mean. It is essentially about speakmunication (1949) carried over into recent theory: ers’ intentions;” that is, the conversational context
(Schwarz 1996:7, quoting Clark and Schober
Transformation of information into meaning
1992). In short, listeners rely more on pragmatic,
involves a digitalization of the analogue. . . The
rather than semantic (or syntactic), information.
importance of this for information and meaning is
Contemporary models based on Shannon’s
the argument that our perception and experiences
approach
are, however, incapable of addressing
are analogue while cognition and meaning are
information other than syntactic (Mingers 1997).
progressive digitalizations of this experience.
Klir and Folger’s (1988) scheme, building upon
. . Meaning, or the semantic content of an
information source is that information and only
Shannon’s, applies easily to syntactic information,
that information, which is held in digital form.
and has been successfully applied to computer sci(Mingers 1997:81; emphasis in original)
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ence. But, as Klir and Folger point out, semantic
and pragmatic information are also required for
human communication:
A measure of uncertainty, when adopted as a
measure of information, does not include semantic
and pragmatic aspects of information. As such,
it is not adequate for dealing with information
in human communication. (1988:140; emphasis
in original)

Such an approach does not say anything
about how or why particular interpretations are
generated or selected, and “information” remains
simply a metric (Mingers 1997). Reduction of
uncertainty in human cognition is accomplished
only when options are eliminated; this requires
a pragmatic connection between the prospective
outcomes of acts and the entities in which they are
applied (Klir and Folger 1988:188).
Schwarz (1996) provides a pragmatic model
in which a tacit assumption underlying the conduct
of conversation is that “communicated information
comes with a guarantee of relevance” (p. 4). Listeners assume the speaker tries to be informative,
truthful, relevant, and clear. Listeners assume that
speakers are to be informative and are to provide
information that is new to the recipient, rather than
to reiterate information that the recipient already
has (p.6). If a speaker violates these assumptions,
s/he runs the risk of being misunderstood, because
listeners still make those assumptions. Thus, communicated information comes with at least a partial
guarantee of relevance, and listeners draw on these
cooperative assumptions in interpreting the speakers contributions. As a result, information that the
speaker considers irrelevant (because of a focus on
semantic meaning) may nevertheless be relevant
for listeners, who focus on pragmatic implications
(Schwarz 1996:16). This information is marked
by context. Information can not be redundant per
Klir and Folger; that is, it can not have zero value,
because a repetition has meaning, it reiterates or
reinforces (Bateson 1972:131). Repetition causes
a state change, because the listener assumes the
speaker intends relevance in that repetition, and/or
the listener may analyze the message in terms that
question the speaker’s communicative abilities and
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social skills, or the listener may choose not to listen.
Problem 4. Limits in Conceptualizing Shared
and Externalized Cognition
I will use the term “externalized cognition” to
refer to those thought processes and environmental
interactions that are distributed among individual
organisms and their tools. Hutchins (1995) provides an example in which the cognitive processes
involved in flying an airplane are distributed among
the cockpit crew and their instrumentation. No
single person internalizes all of the necessary flight
data, no two people interpret data in the same way,
nor do they attempt to do so simultaneously.
Klir and Folger’s (1988) theoretical approach,
as applied to interpersonal communication, is
based upon an individual’s matrix of a priori
assumptions about the probability, possibility, and pragmatics of stimuli (e.g., potential
acts, questions, etc.)(p. 234). The stimuli can
be self-induced or of external origin. Events of
lesser probability represent higher information. For
example, getting a “no” answer when one expects
a “yes” leads to an increase in knowledge (i.e.,
a revision of the probability/possibility matrix),
whereas receiving a “yes” presumably changes little.
But, as discussed above, events of high probability
can also represent increased information (through
redundancy). In Hutchins’ example of the cockpit
crew, such redundancy is critical for crew members
to coordinate distributed cognition. Hence, state
changes can occur irrespective of probabilitypossibility matrices.
Information in such a system of externalized
cognition must be marked by the attribution of
mental states. For example, a speaker may know
that a listener knows something, but has only a partial theory of what the listener knows. The speaker’s
theory is structured by pragmatic context, and must
attribute an appropriate mental state to the would
be listener. Hence, the level of intensionality is
specified by the pragmatic context. Information
marking within contexts is fundamental to the
structure of consensus, because all consensus is
context-specific. Thus, Klir and Folger’s model can
be expanded to include changing contexts external
to individual probability/possibility matrices.
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as photons of light or sound waves. And potential information is not limited to the existence
of some symbol or sound, but includes also the
The Need for a New Approach
Despite the four problems outlined here, Klir context of the moment. For example, a pedesand Folger (1988) provide a rich basis for develop- trian deep in thought might not even notice
cars passing by. The cars alone do not represent
ing a more comprehensive model of information
in human communication and human-ecological
potential to be informed (Ip). The context in this
processes. Surprisingly, no comprehensive attempt example also includes behavior and awareness
to develop such an approach has occurred within
(cognitive predisposition). In this case we could
ecology or the cognitive sciences, in spite of the
expect ∆ to equal 0; that is, no state change. If,
widespread use of Shannon’s index as a metric of
however, our day-dreaming pedestrian strays
ecosystemic complexity and diversity (Ludwig and off the sidewalk onto the street and someone
Reynolds 1988).
yells “look-out,” this different Ip could yield a
There is little agreement about the nature
∆ much greater then zero; that is, a profound
of information, particularly with regard to its
state change. In this highly simplified example,
semantic and pragmatic aspects (Mingers 1997). the words “look out” and their meaning can be
A fundamental problem is that information is
thought of as Ip; the cars can not.
neither a physical entity, nor is it a quantifiable
In sum, information can not occur unless
variable. This inevitably leads to the use of the
the organism or consensual group is predisposed,
word “information” to signify all data available
by pragmatic context, to a change of state (∆),
to a processing system, and has led Gilligan to
which also requires the assimilation and internalpropose the paradox: “What is information?”
ization of data. By this definition, we can distinguish potential information from all the data
How are we to say that there is a difference
that constitute objective reality.
between data and information if there is no way
Because information represents any converto perceive that difference in the world? . . . If
sion from no difference (∆o) to a state of differthere is no distinction between the existence
of information and believing in the existence
ence (∆I), it can be entropic or neg-entropic;
of information, then we cannot talk about
towards certainty or uncertainty. Our pedestrian
information at all. (Gilligan 1997:68)
would be plunged into the realm of uncertainty
upon hearing the words “look out.” Realized
Most attempts to define information have
information (Ir) can be considered a measure of
been attempts to arrive at some explanation for a the difference between
the original state and the
state change, and it is possible to escape Gilligan’s subsequent state—the original context and the
paradox by reverting to the original use of the
resultant context (i.e., a measure of ∆I).
word “information” as a verb:
Other examples of Ir include abstractions
and gists (Brainerd and Reyna 1990), which result
It will suffice (and therefore it should be the
from the need to reduce complexity and coordinate
requirement) to use the word information in
distributed cognition. Information is realized (i.e.,
its original sense, that is, as a verb. There is no
information: we are ‘informed’. (Gilligan 1997:68)
a change of state) by screening data, and becomes
marked potential information when externalized by
Thus, information can be defined as a state individuals for the benefit of others within pragchange (∆); that is, from a state of no difference, matic context. The externalization of data, with the
to a state of difference. By this definition, inforintention of creating the potential for information
mation is neither a constant nor a variable, and
and/or inducing a state change can be defined as
it is certainly not a physical entity. Potential in‘exformation.’
formation (Ip) represents the potential for a state
The information process can be formalized
change, not objective physical phenomena, such by the equation:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.1
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Ip —> Ir = ∆I

(eq. 1)

By this definition, knowledge is not synonymous with information. Information is the change,
whereas knowledge is one result of the change (Ir).
Knowledge can be a state of abstraction that is
achieved as the result of having reduced uncertainty
through information (∆I). But note that knowledge
(Ir) can only be produced if there exists the potential
for information to occur (Ip).
Also, information here does not represent
genetic or ecosystemic organization. The latter is
biological structure, and is the result of information (∆I).
A Model of Information
The information process can be represented
diagrammatically (Figure 2). The concept of epistemological levels utilized here (L0 through L5) derives from Klir and Folger (1988: 194) and includes
a synthesis of concepts from different disciplines
(Table 1). At lower epistemological levels we deal
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only with raw data. At higher levels we increase
the level of analysis of relations among data; sets
become fuzzier and thinking is increasingly more
abstract.
Realized information at any epistemological
level (Ir(Li)) is a function of state changes at lower
levels, and is potential information at higher levels
(Ip(Li+1)) if, and only if, there is a state change ∆I
i-1 at the next lower level, that is greater than 0.
(L )
Stated formally:
Ir(Li) = ∆I (L0. . . i)

(eq. 2)

and
Ir(Li) = Ip(Li+1) if and only if ∆(Li) > 0 (eq. 3)
Informational upgrading occurs when Ip that
results from a state change at one level results in a
state change at a higher level (Figure 2). The potential for this to occur depends on both a sender’s
and receiver’s understanding of how a pattern is
marked. Informational downgrading occurs when a
state change at a higher level feeds back and causes

Table 1: Relations Between Disciplinary Views of Epistemological Levels.
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L4
Collective of Internal Deductions
Shared Cognition

Epistemological Levels

Abstraction
Need to Externalize
Distributed Cognition
Potential for Consensus

∆

3

∆

ExI p

L

2

I

L

1

ExI p

L2

>0

ExI p

L1

p

L3

>0

L2
Induction
Relations Among States
of Variables

∆

L4

>0

L3
Imagination
Deduction

L0

Data

L

ExI p

L1

States of Variables

Screen
of
Variables

Short Term Memory

∆

L

1

Long-Term
Memory
0

Preconscious

Total Redundancy

E x I pu

Key:
switch

tank

sink

information
direction

Figure 2: Partial Model of Information Process and its Distribution over Epistemological
Levels.
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a state change at a lower level.
The text within each box in Figure 2 includes
the terminology that I have chosen for describing
each epistemological level in this synthesis. L0 represents a screen of variables. That is, data will only
be accepted for certain variables, such as sounds
and gestures in conversation. The variable set that
exists at any given moment depends on context and
feedback from higher epistemological levels. Thus,
intentionality can be partly defined as the ability
to choose variables at any level (Li).
L1 is a switch (Figure 2) within which data
(i.e., states of variables or patterns) are evaluated.
Messages that yield no state change (∆1 ≈ 0) are
ignored, they represent absolute redundancy. But
as discussed below, context rarely allows for this
condition because all messages are marked by
cognitive predisposition. Messages that produce
state changes that are small, that is approaching
zero (∆1 -> 0), can be relegated to long-term
memory, or the preconscious (Bateson 1972). An
example is rote repetition of bodily movements,
such as when playing a musical instrument. Other
messages, which produce state changes at L1, are
potential information (Ip) for higher epistemological levels.
In the earlier example of the daydreaming
pedestrian, the words “look out” would force a
downgrading from a higher, more abstract level, to
a complete revision of the variables being screened
at Lo. In particular, the pedestrian would begin
screening for visual and audio variables that might
indicate danger. A state of a variable in L1 might
include a car approaching quickly.
So far, this discussion has focused on the
intrapersonal relationships of the model in Figure
2. As for interpersonal communication, we can
consider the ability to induce a change of state in
another person or group to result from potential
exformation (ExIp; i.e., the intentional creation
of Ip). Because exformation, as a human product,
represents a potential to induce a state change at a
specific epistemological level, it can be said to be
marked (ExIpi). As noted by Schwarz:
In general, determining the intended meaning
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of an utterance requires extensive inferences
on the part of listeners. Similarly, designing an
utterance to be understood by a given listener
requires extensive inferences on the side of the
speaker. In making these inferences, speakers and
listeners rely on a set of tacit assumptions that
govern the conduct of conversation in everyday
life. (Schwarz 1996:7)

Messages can be marked by the context for
relevance, obscurity, ambiguity, quantity and
quality (Schwarz 1996:9). Such marking induces
a revision of variables at Lo.
The concept of information applies not to the
individual messages (as the concept of meaning
would), but rather to the situation as a whole, the
unit information indicating that in this situation
one has an amount of freedom of choice, in
selecting a message, which it is convenient to
regard as a standard or unit amount. (Shannon
and Weaver 1949: 9)

To reiterate an earlier theme of this paper,
language use has primarily to do with people’s
intentions (Schwarz 1996). It is through such
pragmatically contextualized intention that messages are marked. The notion of marked messages
provides an informational foundation for consensus theory (Romney et al. 1986). As defined
in this paper, the potential to inform (Ip) can
include patterns perceivable by the senses, as well
as neurophysiologically coded patterns that have
resulted from previous informational events (i.e.,
ontogenic development and experience), or which
are genetically determined.
An example of neurophysiologically coded Ip
is that some plants look more like each other than
other plants, and people from all cultures tend
to distinguish the same pattern of groups – what
western systematists call the genus (Rosch 1978;
Berlin 1992). Such natural discontinuities in nature
provide an example of patterns with the potential to
inform, but only at certain epistemological levels.
The ability to draw inferences from those patterns
(induction), or make predictions (deduction),
depends on the degree to which the patterns are
marked by experience.
Marking can occur by one person rearranging
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patterns of meaning (e.g., color and form in the
case of modern art) so that they are only recognizable at a specific epistemological level. Marking
also relies on the ability of the receiver to recognize
meaning in patterns. Greater abstraction, when
communicated, leads to a greater state change in
the recipient because state changes are precipitated
at all lower epistemological levels.
Potential exformation (ExIp), therefore, represents the potential for a state change of groups
of individuals to greater consensus. But total consensus is elusive, so we must generalize, essentialize
or gist in order to enhance predictability about the
behavior of others (Hallpike 1986). For example,
writing is essentialization of spoken language,
whereas money is the essentialization that allows
for complex trade and exchange. Realized information (Ir) could represent the degree to which money
increases consensus.
Robb (1997) alludes to the basic psychological need for predictability:
The fact that . . . we continue to employ so-called
causal, or predictive, models in singular cases
suggests to me that they satisfy some deep-seated
psychological needs which are surfaced under the
stress of decision taking. As individuals we try
to think that we are doing the ‘right’ thing and
so we pass some of the responsibility for many
decisions on to an ‘expert’ or ‘guru’ or to a body
of accepted specialist professional knowledge.
How often we must benefit from the ‘placebo
effect’ of employing argumentum ad verecundiam.
(Robb 1997:15)
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